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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY HELD THAT THE REFERENCE
TO THE DITCH IN THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF THE WARDS'
WARRANTY DEED GOVERNS THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION IN MR.
KHALSA'S WARRANTY DEED
A.

The Wards5 Notice Argument Is Circular, and Only Begs the
Underlying Question - Whose Legal Description of the Common
Border Governs?

Mr. Khalsa's opening appeal brief points to the identical metes and bounds of the
common border between the parties legally described in the parties' respective warranty
deeds as indicating their common grantor's intent in selling the two parcels. In response,
the Wards claim that the legal description in Mr. Khalsa's Warranty Deed (Exhibit A
attached to the Brief of Appellant) is irrelevant because he supposedly had notice of the
Wards' ownership of the land in question pursuant to the Wards' Uniform Real Estate
Purchase Contract ("Purchase Contract), which was recorded prior to Mr. Khalsa's
Warranty Deed.
This argument, however, is circular. Mr. Khalsa may have had notice of the
Wards' Purchase Contract pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-3-102(1), but of what exactly does the
Wards' Purchase Contract give him notice? The Wards' notice argument follows that the
Purchase Contract gives Mr. Khalsa actual notice of the legal description contained
therein (which is the same legal description of the Wards' Warranty Deed)1. However,

1

Compare the legal description in the Purchase Contract [R. at 159,ffl[2-4; R. at 147, Yi
2-4] to the legal description in the Wards' Warranty Deed (attached to the Brief of Appellant as
Exhibit B).
1

comparing the legal description of Mr. Khalsa's Warranty Deed to the legal description of
the Wards' property in their Purchase Contract yields the same metes and bounds (or
distances and bearings) of their common border. Thus, looking at the legal description of
the Wards' Warranty Deed or Purchase Contract at the time Mr. Khalsa bought his
neighboring parcel, Mr. Khalsa would have assumed that because his Warranty Deed
contains the same metes and bounds of the common border with the Wards, there was no
I
conflict, and any reference to the ditch was extraneous. The Wards would of course
claim that Mr. Khalsa had notice of the legal description reference to "along a ditch" in
the Purchase Contract which the Wards would claim governs. However, such is the
present dispute between the parties - i.e. does the identical metes and bounds in both
legal descriptions govern or does the! phrase "along a ditch" in the Wards' legal
description govern? Thus, the Wards' notice argument is circular, leading the Court right
to where it otherwise is in this appeal - i.e. how to construe the parties' warranty deed
legal descriptions.
Furthermore, the Wards appear to use U.C A. § 57-3-102(1) to require Mr. Khalsa
to not only do a title search on his property and the chain-of-title leading up to the
purchase of his property, but the Wards would also have Mr. Khalsa do a title search of
all the parcels of property adjacent to his property (including the Wards' parcel). In
effect, the Wards would required Mr. Khalsa to investigate and inspect the chain-of-title
and legal descriptions of all the land adjacent to his. Rather than cite any supporting
caselaw for this expansive view of recorded notice, the Wards simply rely on one case 2

Wilson v. Schneiter's Riverside Golf Course, 523 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1974). The Wilson
court, however, fails to resolve the present dispute at bar because in its brief, one-page
decision, it fails to provide the legal descriptions of the two overlapping properties.
Apparently, the legal description in Wilson must have contained a standard metes and
bounds legal description with no conflicting, extra language such as is contained in the
Wards' Warranty Deed. Further, the legal descriptions of the parties in Wilson must not
have described a common border so that the later-recording party, doing a title search,
would have noticed the lack of a commonly-described border. Indeed, the Wilson court
omits all of these facts which would have be determinative to the present dispute. Thus,
Wilson fails to resolve the dispute at bar.
At the very least, the legal description in the Wards' Purchase Contract and
Warranty Deed is ambiguous, begging the question: does the Eastern boundary of the
Wards' property track along metes and bounds or the ditch? Accordingly, the Wards'
notice argument is of no avail as it is circular and fails to aid the Court in deciding this
appeal.
B.

The Trial Court's Ruling Incorrectly Interprets Utah Law and
Applicable Cannons of Deed Construction
1.

The Wards' Deed Construction Preference Ignores the Overall
Rule of Giving Effect to the Grantor's Intent

The Wards rely on the canon of deed construction which holds that monument
calls govern conflicting courses and distances. The Wards' reliance on this cannon of
construction, however, ignores the critical inquiry - what did the grantor, Mr. Ellsworth,
3

intend to grant? To divine Mr. Ellsworth's intent requires the Court to review the legal
descriptions in the parties' warranty deeds (because his testimony by affidavit or
deposition is unavailable). Because the legal description in the Wards' Warranty Deed
fails to solve the ambiguity of what Mr. Ellsworth intended the Eastern boundary of the
Wards' property to be, the Court must compare the Wards' Warranty Deed to Mr.
Khalsa's Warranty Deed. Because both warranty deeds contain the same course and
descriptions for the common boundary, but only the Wards' Warranty Deed refers to the
ditch, it is reasonable to conclude the Mr. Ellsworth intended the common boundary
between the parcels to be the boundary described by the metes and bounds of both
warranty deeds. Ths conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that deleting the
reference in the Wards' Warranty Deed to the ditch does not effect the description to the
common border. In other words, the legal description in both Warranty Deeds stands
independent of the ditch reference in the Wards' Warranty Deed.
The intent of the grantor was the focus of the court in Neeley v. Kelschu 600 P.2d
979 (Utah 1979), when it stated the principle:
[w]hen the face of a deed shows the intention was to convey a specific quantity of
land and the metes and bound would give that quantity, but a reference to a
monument would embrace more or less than that quantity, the metes and bounds
description should be followed.
Id. at 982 (emphasis added). Further indicative of the intent of the grantor, according to
Neeley, is the "quantity of land" conveyed. In Neeley, the common grantor testified that
it was her intent to have conveyed the disputed land to Kelsch. However, the Neeley
court looked at the acreage such a conveyance would have created for Kelsch - i.e. 23
4

acres - versus the acreage provided for in the warranty deed at issue - i.e. 15 acres - and
concluded that insufficient evidence exists to establish that the grantor intended to convey
the disputed land to Kelsch. Id. at 982. Similarly, as set forth in the Brief of Appellant,
the Wards' Warranty Deed gives them only 6.31 acres, but because the Trial Court
awarded the disputed half acre to the Wards, the Trial Court's award of summary
judgment increases the Wards' acreage to 6.89 acres. In response, the Wards claim that
references to amounts of acreage conveyed is imprecise and thus unreliable. Although
acreage by itself is not the preferred cannon to construe a deed, it nevertheless sheds light
on the grantor's intent.
Further, the common law exception set forth in the Brief of Appellant supports the
cannon that the intent of the grantor is paramount. 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 61
(holding that an inferior means of location may control a higher one when it is apparent
that a mistake exists with respect to the calls; in such case the controlling call is that most
consistent "with the apparent intent of the grantor."). The Wards attempt to distinguish
this exception by distinguishing Neeley again. However, this common law exception is a
principle of law, not a rule, and as such, it applies to different factual situations. Thus,
just because the present case is not factually identical to Neeley does not impugn the
applicability of the Neeley common law exception to the present case.2
2

The other common law exception found in 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 64
similarly applies in cases of clear mistake, "where some other sufficient reason exists for
disregarding the general rule, as where it is apparent from the instrument that boundaries
are to be determined by means of location other than the monument." Section 64 does not
5

Next, the Wards borrow from the aforementioned common law exceptions by
claiming that disregarding the "along a ditch" language in their warranty deed would
result in an absurdity. The Wards claim that Mr. Ellsworth could not have intended to
exclude the disputed piece of land from his sale of property to the Wards (and later
convey it to Mr. Khalsa5s predecessors-in-interest) because such would supposedly result
in the absurdity that if the disputed strip is given to Mr. Khalsa, it is uphill from the ditch
in question, and thus un-irrigatable. Although it may have been the Wards5 intent to use
their property to grow crops, not all land owners of large tracts of land so desire to use
their land as the Wards. In fact, Mr. Khalsa (a businessman, not a farmer) intends to
commercially develop his land. Setting that aside, there is no evidence of record
indicating the use of Mr. Khalsa5 s predecessors-in-interest. Thus, just because Mr.
Khalsa or his predecessors-in-interest might use the disputed strip of land differently than
the Wards does not equate to an absurd use.
One Utah case overlooked to date is Gillmor v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 706
(Utah App. 1995), which divined the intent of the grantor by focusing on the specific
language in the vesting deed:
The [legal] description in question says 'to a point.5 'The words 'to a point9
indicate that the limit is not set by a physical feature, but by a theoretical
location.' Stephen V. Estopinal, A Guide to Understanding Land Surveys 171
(1989). If the deed description had intended to use the road to define the
boundaryy as asserted by Cummings, the description would have followed the
solely apply to conflicts between more than one monument as indicated in the Brief of
Appellees.
6

east side of the road to the point of beginning rather than calling to a point 3
rods east of the quarter corner. Here, the deed refers to the section quarter corner
and follows from that, not from the road.
(Emphasis added). Similarly, the Wards5 legal description in their Warranty Deed
because at a point ("Commencing at a point located South . . . ) and ends at the same
point, indicating that "If the [Ward's Warranty Deed] description had intended to use the
[ditch] to define the boundary, as asserted by Cummings, the [Wards' legal] description
would have followed the [ditch] to the point of beginning."
Finally, although different in facts, Laflin Borough v. Yatesville Borough, 422
A.2d 1186 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1979) supports the overarching principle that "the call
adopted as the controlling one should be the [m]ost consistent with the apparent intent of
the partiesr Id at 1187.
Accordingly, the Wards' preferred deed construction ignores the paramount
cannon of construction requiring courts to give effect to the intent of the grantor.
2.

The Wards5 Supporting Caselaw is Distinguishable

The Wards rely on a number of cases in support of their claim that the cannon of
deed construction holding that a monument controls over a course and distance governs
the present case. These cases, however, are inapplicable to the present action.
The Wards claim that Mahas v. Rindlisbacher. 808 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1990) is
applicable because the legal descriptions in Mahas refers to a canal. As previously set

7

forth in the Brief of Appellant, only the Wards' Warranty Deed refers to a ditch, whereas
both vesting deeds in Mahas refers to a canal. Further, the calls to the canal in both the
legal descriptions at issue in Mahas stand alone, without also calling to a course and
direction. For example, the Mahas plaintiffs legal description reads in pertinent part:
. . .running thence West 1.06 chains; thence South 27 [degrees] West to Canal;
thence Southeasterly along said canal to a point North 15 [degrees] E a s t . . .
Id. at 1026. The Mahas defendant's legal description similarly reads in pertinent part:
. . . thence North 27 [degrees] East 12.00 chains, more or less, to a canal; thence
Southeasterly along canal to a point North 15 [degrees] east 10.18 chains from the
County Road . ..
Id. Both of these legal descriptions expressly call to a canal, without which, both legal
descriptions would be incomprehensible. The Wards claim that "[r]emoving the
reference to the canal or ditch in [the Mahas legal descriptions] would still allow for the
surveyor to complete the survey." (See, Brief of Appellees at 24). Such is impossible.
Removing the reference to the canal in the Mahas plaintiffs legal description would
yield:
. . .running thence West 1.06 chains; thence South 27 [degrees] West to []; thence
Southeasterly [] to a point North 15 [degrees] East. ..
Without the necessary call to the canal, the Mahas plaintiffs legal description is missing

8

an entire boundary.3 Contrast the canal call in the Mahas legal descriptions to the ditch
reference in the Wards' legal description:
. . . thence North 89°55?01M East along a fence line 453.38 feet (138.19 meters);
thence South 07°54'36M West along a ditch 680.80 feet (207.51 meters) to
the point of beginning.
The Wards' legal description not only refers to a ditch, but also gives a course and
distance along the same boundary of the property. Omitting the reference to ditch does
not render the legal description incomprehensible.
The Wards claim this distinction is irrelevant because Mr. Khalsa supposedly had
notice based on the Wards' previously recorded Purchase Contract (or Warranty Deed).
However, as stated above, the Wards' notice argument is circular and unavailing.
Next, the Wards rely on Williams v. Oldrovd 581 P.2d 561 (Utah 1978). As noted
earlier in the Brief of Appellant, Williams is inapplicable to the present case because it
involved only one vesting deed - from a grantor to a grantee - not two vesting deeds of
neighboring grantees (as is the situation in the present case). Based on this, the Williams
court did not have the benefit of two vesting deeds describing a common boundary with

3

The Wards concluded that even without the call in the Mahas legal descriptions
to a canal, a surveyor could complete the survey because the old canal was unknown.
(See, Brief of Appellee at 24). However, there was a fence line that ran along the old
canal. Id. at 1026. And, if the fence line was used as the boundary, both legal
descriptions "close and harmonize with each other." IdL Thus, just because the location
of the old canal was unknown does not mean that any surveyor could have plotted the
Mahas properties from legal descriptions omitting the canal reference.
9

metes and bounds to help it divine the grantor's intent. The Wards' only response to this
critical difference is a footnote reference to their circular notice argument.
Finally, the Wards also rely on Scott v. Hansea 422 P.2d 525 (Utah 1966), but
ignore the distinguishing fact in Scott that the boundary dispute there involved only one
vesting deed, not two like is the situation in the present case. Further, the call to a road in
Scott is necessary to have a complete legal description in that case. Omitting the call in
Scott to the road leaves that vesting deed incomprehensible, which would not be the
situation in the present case.
Accordingly, the caselaw relied on by the Trial Court and the Wards is
distinguishable and inapplicable to the case at bar.
C.

The Wards' Testimony Regarding Mr. Ellsworth's Intent is Hearsay

Focusing on the critical issue of intent, the Wards assert that Mr. Ellsworth
supposedly intended the ditch to be the Eastern boundary of the Wards' parcel. The
Wards support this claim by arguing that "they agreed with Ellsworth that the eastern
boundary would be the Epperson Ditch." (See, Brief of Appellees at 28). However, this
argument is based solely on one paragraph in the Wards' affidavits in which they testify
that:
Prior to our purchase of the Ward Parcel on July 4, 1978, [the Wards] had
discussions with Mr. Ellsworth about the property that we would be purchasing.
During these discussions, we agreed that the boundary between the Ward Parcel
and Mr. Ellsworth's remaining land would be the Epperson ditch.
10

[R. at 158, Tf 6; R. at 146, ^ 6.] To the extent these paragraphs from the Wards' affidavits
refer to what Mr. Ellsworth agreed upon, or imply that he consented or said anything in
support of their understanding, such is hearsay. At best, the Wards can only testify as to
their intent and understanding, not the intent and understanding of Mr. Ellsworth.
Because we have no affidavits or deposition testimony of Mr. Ellsworth, at present his
intent can only be derived from the parties' warranty deeds.
Accordingly, the representations as to Mr. Ellsworth's intent contained in the
Wards' affidavits, is inadmissible hearsay and should not be considered by this Court.
D.

Mr. Khalsa Has Previously Raised the Claim That the Wards5 Legal
Description Is Ineffective Because it Does Not Close, and Said Claim Is
Properly Supported by Evidence

On page three of his Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Mr. Khalsa argued:
Furthermore, note that the length of the common border between the two
parcels in question is exactly 680.8 feet - in both legals. Now, if the language
"along a ditch'* is erased, nothing changes. The bearings and distance are still in
agreement. Thus, "along a ditch" is extraneous and does not affect the bearing and
distance of the common border.
On the other hand, concluding that the common border tracks "along the
ditch" as Defendants claim, would not only contradict the straight line and specific
distance in Defendants' legal description, but would vitiate the identical bearing
and distance in Plaintiffs legal description. In other words, the two legal
descriptions would not "close.55 In order for the two legals to "close,55 the only
possible reading of "along a ditch55 (so as to harmonize it with the otherwise
identical bearings and distances of the common boundary) is to interpret "along a
ditch55 to mean that the common boundary described by the identical bearings and
distances in the two legals generally follows along the line of the ditch. To hold
11

otherwise would require the Court to reform Plaintiffs warranty deed by adding
"along a ditch" into Plaintiffs legal, or to vitiate the identical bearings and
distances in Defendants' and Plaintiffs legal (as set forth above).
[R. at 161.] Thus, Mr. Khalsa clearly raised his closure argument below. Further, the
inability of the Wards' legal description (if the "along a ditch" language is used) to close
is evidenced by the surveyor's plot of the parties' properties and the ditch in Exhibit C
attached to the Brief of Appellant.4 In fact, the illustrative drawing on page eight of the
Brief of Appellees shows the same thing - i.e. the land circumscribed between the
contours of the ditch and the common boundary between the properties does not touch the
northern or southern boundaries of either of the parties' properties. Put another way, said
circumscribed land is floating between the northern and southern boundaries - it does not
close.5
Thus, relying on "along a ditch" as the proper construction of the Wards' Warranty
Deed (and the common boundary between the parties' properties) results in an inability to
4

The Wards claim that surveyor Bing Christensen's affidavit, to which the plot is
attached, is somehow irrelevant to (or is an improper basis for) Mr. Khalsa's claim
because Mr. Christensen gave effect to the "course bearings and distances" in the legal
descriptions of the parties' warranty deeds and supposedly did not give effect to the ditch.
This claim, however, makes no sense in that the surveyor plotted the ditch on his plot of
the parties' properties. (See, Exhibit C attached to Brief of Appellant). That is all Mr.
Khalsa relies on the surveyor for - the plot of the properties and the ditch and the acreage
of the disputed strip of land.
5

Thus, the Wards' claim that the course and distance calls in both the Wards' and
Mr. Khalsa's legal descriptions start and end at the Epperson Ditch (see. Brief of
Appellees at 3) is incorrect.
12

close the boundaries of the parties' properties. Surely, this was not the intent of Mr.
Ellsworth.
E.

Alternatively, Issues of Fact Exist as to Mr. Ellsworth's Intent Which
Preclude Summary Judgment

The Wards take umbrage at Mr. Khalsa's claim that issues of fact exist as to Mr.
Ellsworth's intent that preclude summary judgment in favor of the Wards. Although Mr.
Khalsa has argued that based on the two Warranty Deeds, the Trial Court should have
awarded Mr. Khalsa summary judgment (and this Court should too). Alternatively, if this
Court is not so inclined to rule, it should nonetheless reverse the Trial Court's award of
summary judgment in favor of the Wards because issues of fact exist as to Mr.
Ellsworth's intent vis-a-vis the correct legal description of the common border. There is
nothing inconsistent with such alternative arguments which attorneys routinely make.
As stated above, the Wards' hearsay claim as to Mr. Ellsworth's intent is
inadmissible. Mr. Khalsa does not dispute what the Wards may have understood their
Eastern boundary to be at the time they purchased their land. Naturally, the Wards claim
that their understanding was and is that the ditch is the correct boundary between the
parties' properties. But, their intent does not govern. Mr. Ellsworth's intent governs.
This Court can certainly take notice that the Wards' claim as to what Mr. Ellsworth
intended (at the time they bought their property from Mr. Ellsworth) is hearsay, which
should not be relied upon by the Court.

13

Accordingly and in the alternative, issues of fact exist regarding Mr. Ellsworth's
intent. The Trial Court's award of summary judgment to the Wards should thus be
reversed and this case should be remanded back to the Trial Court for further disposition.
II.

THE WARDS5 BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE CLAIM IS
INAPPLICABLE
The Wards argue that their boundary by acquiescence claim creates issues of fact

precluding the Court from reversing the Trial Court and awarding Mr. Khalsa summary
judgment. This claim is without merit.
For a court to quiet title in a parcel of property based on boundary by
acquiescence, the party claiming title to property under said doctrine must establish: "(0
occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual
acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long period of time, [and] (iv) by
adjoining landowners." Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, <ft 16. "If the party attempting to
establish boundary by acquiescence fails to satisfy any one of the elements of the
doctrine, the boundary is defeated." Id, at ^ 16. (emphasis in the original).
The Wards' boundary by acquiescence claim fails because there are no issues of
fact as to their inability to establish the fourth element which requires that the Wards
owned the land for 20 consecutive years. The Wards attempt to establish this 20 year
period with their Purchase Contract which they recorded on September 12, 1980.
However, the Wards' 20-year period would not begin until they became legal owners
14

pursuant to their Warranty Deed recorded in 1987.
The Wards' 1987 Warranty Deed governs this issue because it establishes that they
became legal owners at that time. Although the Wards had a recorded contract prior to
1987, such did not give them legal ownership. They could have, at any time under the
contract, stopped paying and just walked away. The Wards have not provided the Trial
Court or this Court any caselaw providing them legal ownership of the disputed land
based solely on an executory contract. Also, according to the Purchase Contract,
Defendants' monthly payments consisted of principal and interest, but no taxes. [R at
147.] Thus, Mr. Ellsworth was paying the taxes on the Wards' land until he legally
conveyed it to them in 1987. Had Mr. Ellsworth defaulted on paying taxes, the
government would have pursued him, not the Wards.
In sum, Defendants' boundary by acquiescence claim fails the 20-year ownership
requirement and therefore is inapplicable.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, the Court should reverse the Trial Court's award of
summary judgment in favor of the Wards, and instead award Mr. Khalsa summary
judgment by holding that the correct boundary between the parties' properties is the metes
and bounds description contained in both parties' warranty deeds, not the ditch referred to
in the Wards' Warranty Deed.
15
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